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A puzzle for theories of redundancy:
Exhaustification, incrementality, and the notion of local context⇤
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Ulster University
Abstract The present paper discusses novel data which are problematic for asserta-
bility conditions based on redundancy (Stalnaker 1979, Fox 2008, Schlenker 2009,
Singh 2007, Chierchia 2009, Meyer 2013, Katzir & Singh 2014 among others). The
problem comes from disjunctions like Either Mary isn’t pregnant or (she is and)
it doesn’t show and in particular from the optional presence of she is (pregnant).
These data are even more puzzling if compared to corresponding conditionals like If
Mary is pregnant, (#she is and) it doesn’t show where the she is (pregnant) part is
unacceptable as expected. In response to this puzzle, we present a solution based on
two ingredients: (i) exhaustification and (ii) a notion of incremental redundancy. As
we show, exhaustifying a sentence has an effect on the (incremental) redundancy
status of its constituents. As a consequence of this, she is (pregnant) is actually not
redundant in the disjunctive sentence above, provided the latter is exhaustified. We
explore two possible ways of implementing this solution. The first is based on a
definition of incremental redundancy which does not make use of local contexts as
proposed by Fox (2008, 2013), building on Schlenker 2008. The second is based on
Schlenker’s (2009) incremental theory of local contexts. We then briefly compare
the two implementations and point to a potential advantage of the one based on local
contexts in dealing with the different readings of the disjunctive sentence above.
Keywords: redundancy, scalar implicatures, exhaustification, local context, incrementality,
presuppositions, alternatives
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1 Introduction
Consider the contrast between (1a) and (1b): intuitively, the reason why (1a) is
degraded is that it contains redundant material, namely and she is pregnant. That is,
(1a) as a whole means the same as the less complex (1b), which does not contain and
she is pregnant. Put differently, and she is pregnant in (1a) does not add information
beyond what is already expressed by (1b).
(1) a. #Mary is expecting a daughter and she is pregnant.
b. Mary is expecting a daughter.
Contrasts like (1) motivate the need for a theory of assertability based on redundancy.
Following Stalnaker (1979), a number of such theories have recently been proposed
(Singh 2007, Fox 2008, Schlenker 2008, 2009, Chierchia 2009, Meyer 2013, 2015,
Katzir & Singh 2014). The present paper discusses data that are problematic for
all of these accounts. In particular, we focus on the examples in (2) from Mayr
& Romoli 2013 (see also Chierchia 2009, Katzir & Singh 2014 and Meyer 2015).
The problem is that (2a) and (2b) appear to provide exactly the same information.1
Therefore, on the face of it, she is (pregnant) and in (2a) should be as redundant as
and she is pregnant in (1a), and make (2a) unassertable in the same way. Yet, it is
acceptable. All current theories of redundancy mentioned above incorrectly predict
(2a) to be degraded for the same reason why they predict (1a) to be so.2
(2) a. Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and it doesn’t show.
b. Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or it doesn’t show.
We propose a solution to this problem based on two ingredients: (i) exhaustification
and (ii) a notion of incremental redundancy. As we will show, exhaustifying a
sentence can have an effect on the (incremental) redundancy status of its constituents.
As a consequence of this, she is (pregnant) is not redundant in the disjunctive
sentence in (2a), provided the latter is exhaustified.
We explore two ways of implementing this solution. The first implementation
is based on a definition of incremental redundancy, as proposed by Fox (2008,
2013), building on Schlenker 2008. As we discuss, this implementation also needs
1 For details regarding this point see Section 5.1 below.
2 Note that the example in (2a) has the property that the problematic part she is (pregnant) satisfies
the factive presupposition of the second conjunct in the second disjunct (it doesn’t show (that she
is pregnant)). While this may play a role in improving the naturalness of the example, it is not a
necessary feature of the relevant cases: consider, for instance, the case in (i), that we will use below.
(i) Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and she is happy.
2
A puzzle for theories of redundancy
a constraint on the interaction between redundancy and exhaustification, indepen-
dently proposed in Meyer 2013. Given these ingredients, we will show that, when
exhaustified, sentences like (2a) are not (incrementally) redundant.
The second implementation is based on a theory of redundancy relying on local
contexts. In particular, we make use of the theory of local contexts by Schlenker
(2009). We will show that in Schlenker’s 2009 approach local contexts can change
depending on whether scalar implicatures are taken into account. In particular,
while the local context of she is (pregnant) in (2a) without exhaustification is the
global context intersected with the negation of the first disjunct, the local context
of she is (pregnant) when (2a) is exhaustified is simply the global context. As a
consequence, when (2a) is exhaustified, she is (pregnant) is not redundant in its local
context and thus (2a) is correctly predicted to be acceptable. As we will discuss,
this second implementation is not readily reproducible in a dynamic semantics
approach, where local contexts are computed recursively on the syntactic structure
of the sentence in question (Heim 1983, Beaver 2001; see also Chierchia 2009 for
discussion). Therefore if this implementation is on the right track, it constitutes
an argument for the incremental approach to local contexts by Schlenker (2009).
More generally, redundancy could be taken as a testing ground for the two different
approaches to local contexts mentioned, which are provably equivalent in the domain
of presupposition projection (Schlenker 2007, 2009; see also Chierchia 2009).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the need for a theory of
redundancy and the challenges for such a theory created by (2a). Section 3 intro-
duces our first proposal based on incrementality. Section 4 discusses the second
implementation based on local contexts. Section 5 discusses issues and potential
problems arising with both implementations related to embeddings, the effect of
exhaustification, and the calculation of alternatives. It is shown that a more realis-
tic view of the available alternatives creates certain non-trivial issues for the first
account; issues that do not extend to the implementation based on local contexts.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 A challenge for global and incremental theories of redundancy
This section shows why a theory of redundancy is necessary. It first discusses a
natural way of implementing such a theory by checking redundancy at the global
level only. After this some well-known reasons for modifying the global approach
are introduced. As a first step leading to the solution we propose below, we consider
an incrementalized version of the global approach.
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2.1 A global theory of redundancy
Considering the difference in acceptability between (3a) and (3b), both repeated
from (1), one is led to conclude that the material and she is pregnant is somehow
redundant and that this is the reason why (3a) is degraded relative to (3b). In other
words, a theory of redundancy blocking (3a) appears necessary.
(3) a. #Mary is expecting a daughter and she is pregnant.
b. Mary is expecting a daughter.
Following Stalnaker (1979) but extending his proposal in crucial ways, Meyer (2013)
and Katzir & Singh (2014), among others, develop a theory of non-redundancy
based on the condition in (4).3 The intuition behind such a proposal is that less
complex utterances are to be preferred over equivalent but more complex competitors
because the former are more economical than the latter. More concretely, (3b) is a
simplification of (3a) given (4b). Moreover (3a) and (3b) are equivalent. Therefore,
by (4a), (3a) is blocked by (3b). Given that such an analysis only makes reference
to the global meanings of two potential utterances we refer to this approach as the
global redundancy account.4
(4) Global non-redundancy condition
a. f cannot be used in context c if f is contextually equivalent to y , and
y is a simplification of f .
b. y is a simplification of f if y can be derived from f by replacing nodes
in f with their subconstituents.
Such a theory immediately extends to the data in (5) and (6). In both (5a) and (6a)
and she is (pregnant) is obviously redundant because the competitor sentences in
(5b) and (6b) are equivalent and structurally less complex, respectively.
(5) a. #Mary is pregnant, and she is and she is expecting a daughter.
b. Mary is pregnant, and she is expecting a daughter.
3 We thank Raj Singh (p.c.) for suggesting the specific formulation in (4). Meyer (2013) calls this
condition BREVITY, discusses its problems and proposes a more elaborate version, EFFICIENCY,
based on Katzir’s (2007) notion of structural complexity and a constraint which disallows disregarding
covert operators. We will stick to BREVITY for now—but see below for a discussion of how moving
to EFFICIENCY is necessary for the first solution we propose to the puzzle raised by cases like (2a).
4 Where for our purposes, contextual equivalence can be defined as in (i) (from Singh 2011):
(i) Contextual equivalence:
LFs f and y are contextually equivalent with respect to context c iff
{w 2 c : JfK(w) = 1}= {w 2 c : JyK(w) = 1}
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(6) a. #If Mary is pregnant, then she is and she is expecting a daughter.
b. If Mary is pregnant, then she is expecting a daughter.
A global redundancy account is therefore quite successful. We believe, however,
that there are reasons for assuming an alternative approach to redundancy sensitive
to incrementality, which we discuss in the following.
2.2 An incrementalized theory of redundancy
Consider the contrast between (7a), repeated from (3a), and (7b): the difference in
acceptability shows that the theory of redundancy we are after has to be sensitive to
order somehow (Horn 1972, van der Sandt 1992 among others). This fact, however,
is problematic for the global redundancy account. According to this account, (7b)
should be blocked for the same reasons as (7a) is. In both cases, the potential
competitor assertion is (7c). As both (7a) and (7b) are equivalent to and moreover
more complex than (7c), they should be equally degraded. But only (7a) is. In
other words, complexity and equivalence do not appear to be sufficient reasons for
deciding whether some material in a sentence is redundant and the sentence therefore
is degraded. Rather some way of introducing asymmetry between the conjuncts in
(7a) appears to be necessary in order to distinguish it from (7b).5
(7) a. #Mary is expecting a daughter, and she is pregnant.
b. Mary is pregnant, and she is expecting a daughter.
c. Mary is expecting a daughter.
5 Katzir & Singh (2014) discuss cases similar to (7b) and argue that the asymmetry might instead
be due to two extraneous sources. First, in cases like (7b) it would be due to the fact that one of
the conjuncts satisfies the presupposition of the other (i.e.,Mary is expecting a daughter plausibly
presupposes that she is pregnant) and it is presupposition projection, rather than redundancy, that
would work in an asymmetric fashion. Second, in other cases, the asymmetry might be related to a
reanalysis of the verbs involved in the sentence. The contrast, however, remains also in cases where it
is unclear that any presupposition is involved and the verb is the same in the two conjuncts.
(i) a. #Jack is a syntactician and he is a linguist, (therefore he is the right person to hire).
b. Jack is a linguist and he is a syntactician, (therefore he is the right person to hire).
Katzir & Singh (2014) also present some cases in which the asymmetry is absent. While (iia) is
expected to be degraded, (iib) is not predicted to be so by the asymmetric approaches to redundancy
we will adopt below. We leave this case as an open problem for now.
(ii) a. #John lives in Paris and in France.
b. #John lives in France and in Paris. (Katzir & Singh 2014: (22))
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Fox (2008), building on Schlenker 2008, suggests that the relevant notion of re-
dundancy should be an incremental one, where redundancy is evaluated while the
sentence is parsed following linear order. Incremental redundancy is based on global
redundancy. So we first need to define what it means for part of a sentence to be
globally redundant:
(8) Global redundancy
a. y is globally redundant in f given a context c if f is contextually
equivalent to f 0, where f 0 is a simplification of f without y .
b. y is a simplification of f if y can be derived from f by replacing nodes
in f with their subconstituents.
From (8), we can now define a notion of incremental redundancy following Fox
(2008). The idea is that as we process the sentence from left to right we can evaluate
whether a constituent is contributing to the meaning of the sentence, regardless of
what comes after that constituent. One way of implementing this is to quantify over
all possible continuations at each point in a sentence (Schlenker 2007, 2008):
(9) Incremental redundancy
a. y is incrementally redundant in f given a context c if it is globally
redundant in all f 0, where f 0 is a possible continuation of f at point y .
b. f 0 is a possible continuation of f at point y iff it is like f in its structure
and number of constituents, but the constituents pronounced after y are
possibly different.
Given the notion defined in (9), we are now in position to define an incremental
non-redundancy condition.
(10) Incremental non-redundancy condition: f cannot be used in context c if
any part y of f is incrementally redundant in f given c.
This incrementalized version of the global redundancy condition can account for the
data in (7) above. First notice that the global condition and the incremental condition
both predict (7a) to be deviant. We already know from above that the second
conjunct is globally redundant given the existence of the equivalent simplification
in (7c). The second conjunct is also incrementally redundant for the simple reason
that it is the last constituent in the sentence linearly speaking, and therefore no
possible continuations need to be considered when evaluating redundancy. If a final
constituent is globally redundant, it is always incrementally redundant as well.
The theories, however, diverge on (7b): while the global condition predicts
(7b) to be as bad as (7a), the incremental condition does not. The reason is that
6
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while the first conjunct is globally redundant given the existence of the equivalent
simplification in (7c) again, it is not incrementally so. That is, upon its evaluation
there are possible continuations that do not make it globally redundant. (11a), for
instance, would be such a case because it is equivalent to neither of its simplifications
in (11b) and (11c). The possibility of continuations like that in (11a) prevents the
first conjunct in (7b) from becoming incrementally redundant and the sentence from
becoming non-assertable.
(11) a. Mary is pregnant and she is happy.
b. Mary is pregnant.
c. Mary is happy.
In sum, the incremental redundancy approach improves over the global one on data
like (7a) versus (7b). In the next section, we move on to illustrate a problem for both
the global and the incremental approach to redundancy.
2.3 A general problem for theories of redundancy
Both the global and the incremental redundancy approach face problems with dis-
junctive sentences like (12a), repeated from (2a), in that they predict that the example
should be deviant, contrary to intuitions.
(12) a. Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and it doesn’t show.
b. Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or it doesn’t show.
Notice that (12a) and (12b) are truth-conditionally equivalent. Schematically, it holds
in the general case that for any p and q, p_q and p_ (¬p^q) are equivalent. The
global redundancy condition therefore incorrectly predicts (12a) to be infelicitous,
as the less complex competitor (12b) should be preferred over it.
The incremental redundancy condition does not fare better here. As it is easy to
verify, the she is (pregnant) part is incrementally redundant, because it is globally
redundant no matter what constituent it is followed by. Consider (13a), for instance:
in parallel to (12a), she is (pregnant) here is globally redundant as (13a) is equivalent
to its simplification in (13b). Thus also the incremental redundancy condition
wrongly predicts (12a) to be non-assertable.
(13) a. Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and she is happy.
b. Either Mary isn’t pregnant, and she is happy.
The acceptability of (12a) therefore constitutes a general problem for theories of
redundancy. Both the global and the incremental redundancy conditions incorrectly
7
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predict it to be degraded.6
Notice that any solution to the puzzle raised by (12a) should not affect the existing
explanations for the degradedness of the conditional in (14a) and the conjunction in
(15a). For both (14a) and (15a) we saw above that the global redundancy condition
and therefore also the incrementalized version thereof predicts them to be degraded,
a result that we want to maintain.
(14) a. #If Mary is pregnant, then she is and it doesn’t show.
b. If Mary is pregnant, it doesn’t show.
(15) a. #Mary is pregnant, and she is and it doesn’t show.
b. Mary is pregnant, and it doesn’t show.
Before going on, let us briefly discuss two proposed solutions to the problem above
by Chierchia (2009) and Katzir & Singh (2014). We think they are problematic
precisely because they do not account for the contrast between the disjunction case,
on the one hand, and the conditional and conjunction cases on the other.7
Chierchia 2009 is a theory of redundancy making use of the notion of local
contexts, like the one we will explore in Section 4. Chierchia, however, modifies the
non-redundancy condition, so that it operates at an intermediate level rather than a
local level: the level of binary operators, sometimes called the molecular level.8 The
definition in (16) is rephrased from (29) in Chierchia 2009.
(16) Chierchia’s non-redundancy condition
For any f ,y , binary operator O, and context c : c[f ] 6= c[O(f)(y)].
What (16) requires is that for any binary operator the update of the context with its
first argument alone should not be equivalent to the update of the context with the
operator applied to the first and the second argument. As the reader can verify, (16)
does succeed in allowing cases like (12a). This is because (16) does not evaluate
she is (pregnant) with respect to its local context, where it would be redundant, but
rather compares its contribution to the local context to the contribution of the entire
conjunction she is (pregnant) and it doesn’t show to that same context. Given that
these contributions are different, the sentence in (12a) is correctly predicted to be
6 Notice that (ia) and (ib) with a conditional rather than a conjunction in the second disjunct constitute
an analogous problematic pair. Given that their discussion would involve a discussion of the semantics
of conditionals, we focus on the conjunction case in this paper.
(i) a. Either Mary isn’t pregnant or if she is, it doesn’t show.
b. Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or it doesn’t show.
7 We briefly discuss a third solution proposed by Meyer (2015) in Section 5.1.3.
8 Chierchia’s account is a reaction to the first author’s pointing out to him the crucial data discussed.
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felicitous. While successful with (12a), Chierchia’s (2009) analysis problematically
predicts the conditional and the conjunction in (14a) and (15a) above not to be
deviant, for the same reason that it predicts the disjunction case to be felicitous.
Katzir & Singh (2014) propose an account that is based on general dispreference
for redundant material. Their condition in (17) applies at the local level banning a
function and its arguments if the same information could be conveyed with one of
the arguments alone in a given context (where,c indicates contextual equivalence,
cf. footnote 4).
(17) Katzir & Singh’s non-redundancy condition:
S is deviant if S contains g and JgK = JO(a,b )K,c Jd K, d 2 {a,b}
As the reader can verify, (17) correctly allows the disjunction case in (12a). However,
while Katzir & Singh do not have problems with the conjunction case in (15a), which
is blocked at the global level, the problem for them reemerges in (18). On their
account, (18) is incorrectly predicted to be assertible in the same way as (19) given
that neither at the global nor at the local level there is a constituent that is equivalent
to some of its parts.9
(18) #Mary is beautiful and married, and she is pregnant and married.
(19) Mary is beautiful and married, and she is pregnant.
Summing up, Chierchia’s (2009) and Katzir & Singh’s (2014) proposals solve
the problem of disjunction but they run into trouble with similar cases involving
conditionals or conjunctions.
3 The first implementation: incremental redundancy plus exhaustification
In this section, we show that the incremental redundancy condition predicts (20),
repeated from above, to be assertable when exhaustified.10 It will become clear that
the crucial component of our explanation is the combination of incrementality and
exhaustification.
(20) Either Mary isn’t pregnant or she is and it doesn’t show.
9 As they discuss, their account doesn’t immediately block the conditional case in (14a) either. The
reason for this is that neither the whole conditional is equivalent to its antecedent or its consequent,
nor the embedded conjunction to any of its conjuncts. In response to this, they argue for a solution
based on domain restriction and a treatment of conditionals as generalized quantifiers. We refer the
reader to their work for the details of this proposal in connection to conditionals.
10 We are grateful to Danny Fox (p.c.) who suggested to make use of exhaustification.
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3.1 Exhaustification
In order to implement our proposal, we need a theory of scalar implicatures as
these will play a crucial role. We adopt an exhaustification-based approach to scalar
implicatures (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984, van Rooij & Schulz 2004, Spector
2007, Fox 2007, Chierchia et al. 2012 among others). In this approach, scalar
implicatures are obtained through an exhaustification process, indicated as EXH. We
assume that EXH has the meaning in (21): it applies to a proposition and affirms it,
while negating a subset of its alternatives, the excludable alternatives, indicated as
E xcl(p,A lt(p)).11
(21) JEXHK(p)(w) = p(w)^8q 2 E xcl(p,A lt(p))[¬q(w)]
E xcl is defined in (22). We assume that it yields the following alternatives: first all
the ones that can be consistently negated without contradicting the prejacent— that
is, the proposition p. Second, the set does not include alternatives whose negation
would together with the prejacent lead to the automatic affirmation of another
alternative (Sauerland 2004, Fox 2007; see also Gazdar 1979).12
(22) E xcl(p,P) =
 
q 2 P : p* q^¬9r[r 2 P^ (p^¬q)✓ r] 
For the moment, we think of the relevant alternatives as those created by replacing
Horn-alternatives with each other (Horn 1972). For instance, {or, and} and {some,
all} form Horn-alternatives. A more accurate definition of alternative construction is
given in Section 5.1.2 below.
Let us now go back to a variant of the disjunctive examples we used above:13
(23) Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and she is happy.
11 Notice that here and throughout for convenience we are speaking as if the functionA lt was a function
from propositions to sets of propositions. More precisely, however, it should be treated as a function
from sentences to sets of propositions, as in (i); see Sauerland 2004 among others for discussion.
(i) JEXH SK(w) = JSK(w)^8q 2 E xcl(JSK,A lt(S))[¬q(w)]
12 This is called innocent exclusion in Fox 2007. (22) in the text is not the final version of innocent
exclusion used by Fox, but it is enough for our purposes. For discussion see Fox 2007.
13 We are not using the above examples, repeated in (i), anymore because the inclusive and exclusive
readings do not differ in either of the examples. This is because the two disjuncts cannot be true
together: it can’t both be true that Mary is not pregnant and it doesn’t show that she is pregnant. This
is not the case for the example in (24), which allows us to discuss the effect of exhaustification.
(i) a. Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and it doesn’t show.
b. Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or it doesn’t show.
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(24) Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is happy.
The simple disjunction in (24) has the alternatives in (26). Exhaustification of the
disjunctive proposition negates its stronger alternative with conjunction. The result
of this is the exclusive interpretation in (26).
(25) A lt(JMary isn’t pregnant or she is happyK) =
{JMary isn’t pregnant or she is happyK,JMary isn’t pregnant and she is happyK}
(26) JEXH [either Mary isn’t pregnant or she is happy]K =Jeither Mary isn’t pregnant or she is happyK^
¬JMary isn’t pregnant and she is happyK
Crucially, the alternatives to our case in (23), on the other hand, are as in (27).14 Note
that the presence of she is (pregnant) in the second disjunct renders the alternative
with and in (27) extra strong, in fact contradictory (i.e., abstractly, it is of the form
¬p^ (p^q)).
(27) A lt(JMary isn’t pregnant or she is and she is happyK) =
{JMary isn’t pregnant or she is and she is happyK,JMary isn’t pregnant and she is and she is happyK}
Consequently, the exhaustification as in (28) amounts to negating a contradiction.
This does not have an effect on the basic meaning of (23), as a tautology is added to
the plain meaning. In other words, exhaustification is vacuous in this case.
(28) JEXH [either Mary isn’t pregnant or she is and she is happy]K =Jeither Mary isn’t pregnant or she is and she is happyK
3.2 Accounting for the data
We now show what happens with respect to (non-)redundancy if our crucial example,
repeated once more in (29a), is exhaustified as in (30). In order for she is (pregnant)
not to count as redundant under the incremental redundancy condition it must as a
first step not be globally redundant. And note that exhaustification per se does not
help because even under the parse in (30a), (29b) without EXH should count as a
simplification, as in (30b). Since we have just seen that exhaustification in the case
of (30a) is vacuous, the unexhaustifed (30b) would still be equivalent to it. From
this it would follow that she is (pregnant) is still globally redundant.
14 This is strictly speaking not correct. The conjunction embedded in the second disjunct itself introduces
further alternatives so that the set of alternatives would actually be larger. We ignore this complication
for the moment and return to discussion of it in Section 5.1.2.
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(29) a. Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and she is happy.
b. Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is happy.
(30) a. EXH [either Mary isn’t pregnant or she is and she is happy]
b. [either Mary isn’t pregnant or she is happy]
Moreover, it is easy to show that she is (pregnant) in (30a) is also incrementally
redundant. That is, it is globally redundant for any of its possible continuations.
For instance, if we replace the final constituent in (30a) with for instance the one in
(31a), we find that she is (pregnant) is still globally redundant when compared to the
equivalent simplification in (31b). Therefore (29a) is predicted to be non-assertable,
even if exhaustified as in (30a).
(31) a. EXH [either Mary isn’t pregnant or she is and it doesn’t show]
b. [either Mary isn’t pregnant or it doesn’t show]
There is, however, a simple way of modifying the notion of global redundancy
suggested by Meyer (2013), based on Katzir 2007, Fox & Katzir 2011, which allows
exhaustification to become a solution here. The idea is essentially to disallow EXH to
be deleted when constructing simplifications. For our purposes, we can express this
as an extra clause of the definition of global redundancy in (8) as in the underlined
part in (32).15 The notion of incremental redundancy and the incremental non-
redundancy condition from (9) and (10), respectively, above remain untouched by
this move.
(32) Global redundancy with Meyer’s constraint
a. y is globally redundant in f given a context c if f is contextually
equivalent to f 0, where f 0 is a simplification of f without y .
b. y is a simplification of f if y can be derived from f by replacing
nodes in f with their subconstituents,
without deleting any instance of EXH present in f
This means that (29b) analyzed as in (30b) without EXH is a legitimate simplification
of (29a) only if the latter is not exhaustified either. If that is the case, (29b) blocks
(29a) from being assertable as before. As soon as (29a) is exhaustified, however,
its simplification must be exhaustified too according to (32b). That is, the com-
petitors are as in (33). Now we know from the preceding section that these are not
equivalent. In particular, while exhaustification is vacuous in (33a), it is not so in
(33b). Therefore she is (pregnant) is not globally redundant and that entails that it is
15 This modification of the global redundancy condition is what Meyer (2013) calls EFFICIENCY (see
footnote 3 above). She motivates this on the basis of data related to Hurford’s constraint (see Meyer
2013: pp. 81–86 for discussion).
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also not incrementally redundant. In other words, (29a) becomes assertable when
exhaustified.
(33) a. EXH [either Mary isn’t pregnant or she is and she is happy]
b. EXH [either Mary isn’t pregnant or she is happy]
3.3 Another argument for incrementality
Since we have just seen that she is (pregnant) is not even globally redundant in
(33a), one might wonder whether the global redundancy condition might not have
sufficed for the data considered in this paper. That is, if we ignore the order-related
effects discussed in Section 2.2, do we need incremental redundancy for accounting
for the disjunction puzzle we are focusing on in this paper? As we will see now, we
do need incremental redundancy even for explaining our case alone, as the global
redundancy condition cannot account for the felicity of simple variants of our crucial
example like (34).
(34) Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and she is expecting a daughter.
The crucial property of (34) is that in the second disjunct the second conjunct (she is
expecting a daughter) entails the first one (she is (pregnant)). This makes it so that
when we exhaustify (34) as in (35a), its exhaustified simplification in (35b) comes
out as equivalent to it.
(35) a. EXH [Mary isn’t pregnant or she is and she is expecting a daughter]
b. EXH [Mary isn’t pregnant or she is expecting a daughter]
We know from before that the exhaustification of (35a) is vacuous. The exhaustifi-
cation of (35b) is vacuous for the same reason: the conjunctive alternative of (35b)
in (36) is contradictory and therefore its exclusion only adds a tautological meaning
to the literal meaning of (35b). Therefore the two sentences are equivalent and, as a
consequence, (34) should not be assertable under the global redundancy condition.
(36) Mary isn’t pregnant and she is expecting a daughter.
The incremental redundancy condition, on the other hand, can account for the
assertability of (34) if it is exhaustified as in (35a). This is because she is (pregnant)
is not incrementally redundant. That is, it is not true that for any possible way of
continuing the sentence after she is (pregnant) in (35a), she is (pregnant) is going
to end up globally redundant. Indeed, the problematic disjunction we started our
discussion with constitutes a case in which it is not globally redundant provided the
sentence is exhaustified, as in (37).
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(37) EXH [either Mary isn’t pregnant or she is and she is happy]
In sum, the incremental redundancy condition proposed by Fox (2008), together
with exhaustification and Meyer’s (2013) constraint on deletion of EXH, can account
for all variants of the puzzling disjunctive data discussed. This implementation is
based on a theory of redundancy which doesn’t make use of a notion of local context.
In the next section, we consider, instead, an alternative implementation based on
local contexts. As we will show, within this approach, not all ways of implementing
local contexts will do. In Section 5.1.3 we will briefly compare the two solutions
proposed and point to an advantage of the implementation based on local contexts.
4 The second implementation: local contexts plus exhaustification
4.1 Local contexts and redundancy
Stalnaker’s original intuition regarding redundancy was that a sentence is redundant
and thus non-assertable if the context entails it. This principle allows a straightfor-
ward account of the oddness of (38) in the indicated context (adapted from Schlenker
2008). The context already entails the information that Mary is pregnant, so the
sentence in (38) does not add anything to it. It is redundant and thus non-assertable.
(38) Context: Mary just announced she is expecting a daughter. Her husband
adds:
#She is pregnant.
The contrast between (39a) and (39b), repeated from (7) above, could also be
accounted for provided that Stalnaker’s non-redundancy condition is relativized to
local contexts, as in (40) (Singh 2007, Fox 2008, Schlenker 2008, 2009, Chierchia
2009 among others). We will refer to an analysis based on (40) as a local redundancy
account.
(39) a. #Mary is expecting a daughter, and she is pregnant.
b. Mary is pregnant, and she is expecting a daughter.
(40) Local non-redundancy condition
f cannot be used in context c if there is any part y of f such that the local
context of y entails y .
For the sake of presentation we will make use of the notion of Context Change
Potentials (CCPs) from the dynamic framework for the moment, as they transparently
express local contexts. Following Karttunen (1974), Heim (1983), Beaver (2001),
Schlenker (2009) among others, the local context for the second conjunct of a
conjunction is the initial context c intersected with the first conjunct. Following
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Heim (1983) in particular, the CCP of a conjunction encoding in which order the
parts of the conjunction get added to the context c has to be stated as in (41), where
c[f ] stands for those worlds in c in which f is true, i.e., {w2 c : f(w) = 1} (provided
that f is defined in c).
(41) c[f and y] = c[f ][y]
Given (41), there is now a difference between the second conjuncts of (39a) and
(39b) with respect to whether they add information to their respective local contexts.
In the former case the local context of the second conjunct entails that Mary is
pregnant. Therefore the second conjunct is redundant in its local context, and the
sentence is non-assertable given (40). In the case of (39b), on the other hand, the
local context of the second conjunct does not entail that Mary is expecting a daughter.
As such the second conjunct is not redundant, and (39b) is predicted to be acceptable.
Notice that the contrast just discussed is also found at embedded levels as in (42)
(adapted from Singh 2007). While the two sentences provide the same semantic
information at the global level, only (42a) is degraded.16 The asymmetry between
the conjuncts introduced by (41) together with the local non-redundancy condition
(40) accounts for the difference in acceptability.
(42) a. #Every woman who is expecting a daughter and is pregnant will get a
tax discount.
b. Every woman who is pregnant and expecting a daughter will get a tax
discount.
Given that the works cited above argue that the local context for the consequent of
a conditional is the initial context c intersected with the antecedent as in (43), the
account just presented immediately extends to the acceptability contrast found in the
conditionals in (44).17
(43) c[if f then y] = c  (c[f ]  c[f ][y])
(44) a. #If Mary is expecting a daughter, she is pregnant.
b. If Mary is pregnant, she is expecting a daughter.
16 Note that given the observed asymmetry at the embedded level only the incremental redundancy
condition but not the global one could account for these data.
17 The CCP in (43) mirrors the truth-conditions of material implication. That is, the update of a context
c with a conditional if f then y leaves in c only those worlds in which it is not true that f holds
and y doesn’t. This semantics of conditionals has been argued by many to be inadequate. Notice,
however, that nothing would change with respect to the conclusions drawn in the text if we were to
adopt a more sophisticated semantics for conditionals. Given that the conditional in (44a) is true if
the antecedent is true, the consequent is redundant in all semantics of conditionals that we are aware
of (see von Fintel 2012 for a discussion of the different options in the literature).
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The local redundancy account coupled with the CCPs in (41) and (43) also accounts
for the contrasts in (45) and (46), repeated from above. In both (45a) and (46a) she
is (pregnant) is redundant because the local contexts entail that Mary is pregnant.
(45) a. #Mary is pregnant, and she is and she is expecting a daughter.
b. Mary is pregnant, and she is expecting a daughter.
(46) a. #If Mary is pregnant, then she is and she is expecting a daughter.
b. If Mary is pregnant, then she is expecting a daughter.
Summing up, by extending Stalnaker’s (1979) constraint on speech acts to the local
level in the way of the local non-redundancy condition we obtain a general theory of
redundancy. With this in mind, let us now turn to the problematic disjunctive data.
4.2 The local contexts of disjunction
Is (47), repeated from above, predicted to be degraded because of redundancy
under the view just outlined? In order to know whether she is (pregnant) counts as
redundant one needs to know what the local context of the second disjunct is.
(47) Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and she is happy.
Beaver (2001) and Schlenker (2009) among others argue that the local context of the
second disjunct of a disjunction is the global context c updated with the negation of
the first disjunct. In other words, the CCP for disjunction is as in (48).
(48) c[f or y] = c[f ][ (c  [f ])[y]
By (48), (47) is predicted to be deviant by the local redundancy account, too. The
reason is that the local context for the second disjunct, she is (pregnant) and she
is happy in (47) entails that Mary is pregnant due to the negation of Mary isn’t
pregnant. Given the standard assumption that the local context of the first conjunct
of a conjunction is the same as the context of the whole conjunction (cf. (41)), the
local context of the first conjunct she is (pregnant) would also entail that Mary is
pregnant. As a result, she is (pregnant) should be redundant and (47) degraded.
That ¬p is entailed by the local context of q in p_q has been argued for on the
basis of presupposition projection. For instance, for the presupposition triggered
by stopped in (49) that Mary used to smoke to be satisfied, the negation of the
first disjunct must be true (Gazdar 1979, Roberts 1989, Schlenker 2009). That is,
a disjunction p_ q, where q has a presupposition r, presupposes the conditional
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statement ¬p! r.18
(49) Either Mary never smoked, or she stopped.
This hypothesis on the local context of the second disjunct of a disjunction is further
supported by recent predictive accounts of local contexts. Such accounts all predict
that the second disjunct of a disjunction entails the negation of the first (Schlenker
2009, Rothschild 2011 among others).
Geurts (1996), however, argues that the local context for both disjuncts in p_q
should be the global context c. Crucially, according to him, the one for q does not
include ¬p. In other words, Geurts assumes a CCP for disjunction as in (50) (see
also Simons 2000). This would have the immediate consequence that when we
evaluate whether she is (pregnant) in (47) is redundant, the first disjunct becomes
immaterial. As a result she is (pregnant) is not predicted to be redundant.
(50) c[f or y] = c[f ][ c[y]
For the presuppositional case in (49), Geurts suggests that the presupposition of the
second disjunct is locally accommodated. That is, the local context for she stopped
(smoking) is c intersected with the set of worlds where Mary used to smoke so that
the appropriate paraphrase for (49) would be Either Mary never smoked or she did
smoke and stopped.19 In sum, Geurts’ analysis complemented with a theory of local
accommodation can account for (49). This approach has, however, problems with
other cases. In the following, we illustrate one.20
Consider a sentence like (51), which is felicitous out of the blue and intuitively
presuppositionless.
(51) Either John doesn’t smoke, or Mary does too.
18 Disjunction might in fact be symmetric with respect to local contexts. This is supported by the fact
that (i) appears to have exactly the same properties with respect to presupposition projection as (49).
We will briefly return to this issue in Section 5.4.
(i) Either Mary stopped smoking, or she never smoked in the first place.
19 It remains to be explained why the presupposition cannot be globally accommodated, where the
sentence would have the unattested meaning paraphrasable asMary used to smoke, and either she
never smoked or she stopped. There is a natural reason blocking global accommodation in this case,
though. As is clear from the paraphrase, global accommodation would conflict with the felicity
condition of disjunctions requiring the disjuncts not to be settled in the context (Gazdar 1979; see
also Heim 1992 and Schlenker 2008).
20 For other arguments in favour of the local context proposed by Beaver/Schlenker see Schlenker 2008:
p.187-188.
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As discussed, in Geurts’s (1996) account this would be explained by the assumption
that the presupposition of too is locally accommodated in the second disjunct.
However, as is well-known in the literature, the presupposition of too is very hard if
not impossible to locally accommodate (Abusch 2002, Simons 2001, Romoli 2012,
Klinedinst 2012, Chemla & Schlenker 2012). Chemla & Schlenker (2012), building
on Klinedinst (2012), for instance, observe the contrast between a case like (52) and
cases like (53).
(52) TEACHER: Johnny claims that you gave him a black eye. Is this true?
BILL: I don’t know, #but if I gave Susie a black eye too, they’ll be twins.
(53) TEACHER: Johnny claims that Mary participated in the Marathon. Is this
true?
BILL: I don’t know, but if she won, we should celebrate with her.
In both cases Bill is explicitly saying that he is ignorant about the presupposition of
the sentence within the antecedent of the uttered conditional. So the only option to
rescue these sentences is by local accommodation of the presupposition within the
antecedent. However, while this is easily done in the case of win, it appears very
hard in that of too. In other words, while (53) can be read as I don’t know but if (she
participated and) she won, we should celebrate with her, (52) does not appear to
have a reading similar to If (I gave Johnny a black eye and) I gave Susie a black eye,
they’ll be twins.
The question for an advocate of Geurts’s (1996) approach then is why local
accommodation with too would go nice and smoothly in (51) but not in (52)? Notice
that, as Chemla & Schlenker (2012) discuss, the anaphoric component of too is
satisfied in both (51) and (52). In other words, the explanation for the felicity of
(51) cannot be that the presence of John in the first disjunct allows for too to be
anaphoric to it, which in turn allows local accommodation of John used to smoke
in the second disjunct so that the presupposition is satisfied. The same should be
possible in (52), contrary to fact. In other words, Geurts’s (1996) account does not
predict the difference in felicity betwen (51) and (52).
Notice that, on the other hand, under an analysis where the local context of the
second disjunct includes the negation of the first one the acceptability of (51) is
straightforwardly predicted: the local context entails that a salient individual in the
context different from Mary smokes and this satisfies the presupposition, with no
need for local accommodation.
The predicament we find ourselves in is the following: on the one hand, the
data presented in this paper appear to support Geurts’s (1996) view that the local
context for q in a disjunction p_q is the global context without any contribution
by p, because only then the local non-redundancy condition would not be violated.
18
A puzzle for theories of redundancy
On the other hand, for the reasons just discussed there appears to be evidence
for Beaver’s (2001) and Schlenker’s (2009) views that the local context of q is
indeed the local context enriched with the negation of p. The latter view, however,
creates the problem that our crucial data should be non-assertable given the local
non-redundancy condition. It would be ideal, therefore, if these views could be
reconciled somehow.
One could at this point assume a lexical ambiguity: that is, one could assume
that or would have both the lexical entry proposed by Geurts, and the one argued for
by Beaver, Schlenker, and others. Moreover, for this move not to be ad hoc for the
problem above, one might try to align this ambiguity with the inclusive-exclusive
distinction in the interpretation of disjunction. In other words, one could associate
one of these lexical entries with the exclusive interpretation of disjunction and the
other one with the inclusive interpretation.21 We think that there is something to
this idea, but we do not think that lexical ambiguity is the right way to go. The
reason is that there are various arguments in the literature against a lexical ambiguity
account of the exclusive versus inclusive distinction. An account based on scalar
implicature is empirically more adequate than a lexical ambiguity account (see
Sauerland 2012 and references therein for discussion).22 In the following, we will
suggest something similar to aligning one local context of disjunction with the
exclusive interpretation of or and the other with the inclusive one. However, we will
argue for a structural ambiguity analysis of the inclusive-exclusive distinction by
adopting the exhaustification-based view of this distinction discussed in section 3,
which will avoid the problems for the lexical ambiguity approach. We show that
Schlenker’s (2009) view of local contexts together with the local non-redundancy
condition just introduced makes exactly the right predictions for the problematic
disjunctions.
21 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for discussion on this point.
22 For instance, Spector (2010) points out a problem for the lexical ambiguity account having to do
with cases of ellipsis. Ellipsis being subject to a parallelism constraint would lead us to expect that
disjunction in (i) is interpreted in the same way in both VPs, but it is not. The salient interpretation of
(i) is that Jack solved either problem 1 or problem 2 but not both, whereas Mary did not solve any
of the problems. That is, in the first case disjunction is interpreted exclusively, and in the second
one inclusively. This is unexpected under the lexical ambiguity view, but follows directly in a scalar
implicature based account where negation would disallow the exclusive reading in the second case.
In the first, however, the exclusive interpretation would not be blocked given that negation is absent.
(i) Jack solved either Problem 1 or Problem 2, but Mary didn’t.
As a consequence, specifying one CCP for or modeled on the inclusive interpretation and another
one modeled on the exclusive interpretation would not be in accordance with the facts about the
inclusive-exclusive distinction.
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Before moving on to Schlenker’s (2009) system, however, let us discuss briefly
how simply adopting exhaustification within a dynamic system, does not provide a
solution to the disjunctive problem we are focusing on here. In particular, the obstacle
we see is the following. In a dynamic approach, local contexts are determined by the
CCPs assumed for lexical items together with the syntactic structure of the sentence.
In the case at hand, the local context of the second disjunct of a disjunction embedded
in some more complex structure is going to be determined by the way disjunction
combines with its propositional arguments before it combines with anything else.
More specifically, the meaning of an exhaustified disjunctive sentence of the form
[EXH [A or B]] is determined by its components EXH and [A or B]. Therefore, we
need to have a meaning for [A or B], independently from EXH. As shown above,
there are reasons for assuming a CCP for disjunction like (54). And, as we know,
(54) together with the local non-redundancy condition incorrectly rules out our
sentence (55), without exhaustification.
(54) c[f or y] = c[f ][ (c f)[y]
(55) Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and she is happy.
Would exhaustification help rescuing (55)? It is not clear to us how it could. The
problem is that when EXH combines with its prejacent, redundancy will arise given
the CCP of the latter. This is because EXH is defined as to assert its prejacent.
Consider a natural way of defining a dynamic version of EXH:
(56) c[EXH(f)] = c[f ]\ (c SE xcl(f ,A lt(f)))
Once we have a CCP for EXH like (56) and apply it together with the CCP for
disjunction in (54) to a sentence like (55), we run into redundancy again. More
specifically, redundancy arises in the part corresponding to the prejacent. The
computation in (57) shows that f ends up being redundant in its local context,
c  not f (= c[f ]). We know that the exhaustification on the right hand side is
vacuous. But on the left hand side, which corresponds to the prejacent, we run into
redundancy. This becomes particularly evident in the last line of (57).
(57) c[EXH(not f or (f and y))] =
c[not f or (f and y)]\ (c SE xcl(not f or (f and y),A lt(f or (f and
y)))) =
c[not f or (f and y)]\ (c ?) =
c[not f ][ (c not f)[f and y] =
c[not f ][ (c[f ])[f ][y] = . . .
For this reason, as far as we can see, it is not obvious how to obtain a solution to
our problem in a dynamic system based on Context Change Potentials. As we will
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see now, however, a solution is available in a static theory of local contexts like
Schlenker’s (2009) (see also Section 5.5).23
4.3 Local contexts Schlenker’s style
In Schlenker’s (2009) system, local contexts arise from a pragmatic algorithm that
operates incrementally on a sentence S. The procedure is based on the standard idea
that when we interpret a sentence S in a given context (set) c we try to determine
which worlds of c are compatible with the content of S—that is, the task in the end
is to disregard any c-world that does not make S true. Schlenker assumes that this
process is based on two ingredients: first, it proceeds left-to-right, whereby for any
two subparts s and s0 of S such that s precedes s0, the compatibility of c-worlds with
s is determined before that of s0 is.24 Second, the procedure is based on a minimal-
effort principle: at any given point s of the sentence S, we limit our attention to those
worlds for which the value of s can make a difference on the overall value of S, given
everything else we have already seen in the incremental parsing of the sentence. The
result is that we often evaluate s not with respect to the entire context c but with
respect to a subset of it, call it c0. This c0 is the local context of s.
More formally, the notion of local context is defined in (58), where lc(c,d,a_b)
refers to the local context of an expression d in a given string adb uttered in context
c.25 The local context of d corresponds to exactly that set of worlds x in c that can
affect the overall value of adb. That is, by interpreting d with respect to this restricted
set of worlds x, the same outcome is ensured as when no such restriction applies.
Given that evaluation with respect to a smaller set of worlds is more economical,
one must restrict the context whenever possible. Moreover, this procedure neither
looks at the actual content of d nor at what actually follows d. By quantifying
23 As discussed in footnote 22 there are good reasons for thinking that a lexical account of the exclusive-
inclusive disjunction is not on the right track. But even if one were to push such an account, it should
be noticed that there is nothing in the exclusivity of disjunction that would force one to adopt (i) over
(ii) as the CCP for exclusive disjunction. Clearly, only (i) would avoid the problematic redundancy,
however (thanks to an anonymous reviewer for discussion on this point).
(i) c[f orex y] = (c[f ][ c[y])  c(f \y)
(ii) c[f orex y] = (c[f ][ (c f)[y])  c(f \y)
24 Notice that Schlenker (2009) has also proposed a last-resort symmetrical strategy, in addition to the
incremental one. In the case relevant for us both strategies make the same prediction. See Section 5.4
and also Rothschild 2011 for discussion.
25 Two things: first we are assuming for present purposes that the material d and d0 can range over are
only propositions. Second, the condition here has to be relativized to those cases in which a local
context exists; see Schlenker 2009 for discussion.
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over replacements of d, it is ensured that the notion of local context derived is
general rather than specific to a particular construction at hand. By quantifying over
grammatical endings—what is sometimes referred to as good finals—the left-right
parsing asymmetry is built into the system.
(58) Local context of d in adb= lc(c,d,a_b) =
the strongest element of {x : x is an object of the type specified by d such
that for any d0 of the same type as d and every grammatical b0 that can
linearly follow d, a[c0 & d0]b0 ,c ad0b0, where x is the semantic value of
c0}
To illustrate with an example, consider the conjunction in (59) uttered in some context
c. The algorithm demands that we ask whether any worlds in c can be ignored when
computing the value of (59) and thus whether (59) can be interpreted relative to a
(proper) subset of c. Since the interpretation procedure proceeds incrementally, it
follows that the first conjunct of (59) is processed first. As a consequence asking
whether (59) can be interpreted relative to a subset of c is tantamount to asking
whether the first conjunct can be interpreted relative to a subset of c. At this point,
we do not know anything about the content of the sentence to follow. Therefore we
cannot restrict c to a proper subset by leaving out some world w and interpret the
first conjunct relative to that subset. If we did and it turned out that both conjuncts
are true at w, it would follow that we excluded a world from c that might be relevant
given that it would make (59) true. Thus we do not restrict c and determine that c is
the local context for the first conjunct in (59).
(59) Mary is pregnant, and she is expecting a daughter.
At the point of interpretation of the second conjunct, things are different as the
content of the first conjunct has been processed. Worlds in c making the first
conjunct false make the whole (59) false, regardless of the value of the second
conjunct. Therefore, we avoid evaluating the second conjunct in those worlds in c
in which the first conjunct is false, i.e., we restrict c to that subset where the first
conjunct is true - the local context of the second conjunct. More schematically, the
local context of the first and second conjuncts of a conjunction of the form p and q
are defined in (60) and (61).
(60) lc(c, p,(_ and q)) = c
(61) lc(c,q,(p and _)) = c\ JpK
Let us now turn to disjunction. Consider first (62) under the inclusive interpretation.
Given that the local context is defined incrementally, Mary isn’t pregnant has the
same local context as the first conjunct in a conjunction, the initial context c.
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(62) Mary isn’t pregnant or she is happy.
What is the local context of the second disjunct instead? The first disjunct has been
processed at this point. If it is true, the whole disjunction is true, and the hearer need
not worry about the truth of the second disjunct at all. From this it follows that the
truth of the second disjunct is only relevant in case the first disjunct is false. That
is, the local context of she is happy in (62) corresponds to the intersection of the
initial context c and the negation of the first disjunct, c  JMary isn’t pregnantK (=
c\ JMary is pregnantK). Could we leave out a world w in which Mary is pregnant
from the local context— i.e., a world in which the negation of the first disjunct is
true? No, because in that case, the value of the whole disjunction in w would depend
on the value of the proposition that Mary is happy in w: if the latter is true, the
whole disjunction would be true in w, otherwise it would be false. But then we
cannot avoid considering w when evaluating the second disjunct. So we conclude
that the local context for the second disjunct is exactly c  JMary isn’t pregnantK.
More schematically, the local contexts of a disjunction of the form p or q are defined
as in (63) and (64).
(63) lc(c, p,(_ or q)) = c
(64) lc(c,q,(p or _)) = c  JpK
Since the local contexts for conjunction and disjunction correspond to the ones
assumed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the predictions of the local non-redundancy condi-
tion discussed there carry over once one adopts Schlenker’s view. In particular, the
familiar (65) is predicted to be degraded contrary to fact.
(65) Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and she is happy.
To illustrate, consider the schematic version not-p or (p and q): we know from above
that the local context of the second disjunct (p and q) in some context c is as in (66).
(66) lc(c,(p and q),not-p or _) = c  Jnot pK
Moreover, we know that the local context of the first conjunct p of a conjunction of
the form (p and q) in some c is simply c:
(67) lc(c, p,(_ and q)) = c
From these two things together, it follows that the local context of p in not-p or (p
and q) in a context c is:
(68) lc(c, p,not-p or (_ and q)) = c  Jnot pK = c\ JpK
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And of course, for any p and c, (c\JpK)✓ JpK. Therefore we have that p is redundant
in its local context and that a sentence like (65) is incorrectly blocked also in this
approach. Given our solution for the acceptability of (65) based on the incremental
redundancy condition, however, we should now ask whether exhaustification has
an effect on the local context for the second disjunction. We will show in the next
section that it indeed does. In particular, we show that exhaustification makes she is
(pregnant) in (65) non-redundant in its local context.
4.4 Back to the problem
4.4.1 Exhaustification and local contexts of disjunction
Consider again the disjunction in (62), but this time exhaustified as in (69).
(69) EXH [Mary isn’t pregnant or she is happy]
Let us now show that exhaustification does not affect the local context of the first
disjunct, but modifies the one of the second disjunct so that it becomes simply the
global context c. In order to facilitate discussion, let us make the interpretation of
(69) a bit more concrete as in (70):
(70) JMary isn’t pregnant or she is happyK^¬JMary isn’t pregnant and she is happy]K
The question is again which worlds we can disregard when evaluating the second
disjunct. In the case of (62) we could ignore worlds in which the first disjunct was
true because those would have made the entire disjunction true anyway, regardless
of the value of the second disjunct. (70), however, shows that if the first disjunct in
(69) is true, (69) is not automatically true: it is true only if the second disjunct is
false. In other words, given exhaustification, the value of the second disjunct is not
only relevant in the case where the first disjunct is false, as before, but in addition
also in the case where it is true. Thus the local context of she is happy in (69) must
include both worlds where Mary is pregnant and where she is not. This, in turn,
means that we cannot leave out any world w from c in which Mary is not pregnant.
So we conclude that the local context for the second disjunct is exactly c, i.e., no
further restriction is possible. More formally, the local context of p in a sentence of
the form EXH(not-p or (p and q)) is as in (71).
(71) lc(c, p,EXH(not-p or (_ and q))) = c
To illustrate, consider that by definition, the local context of p is the strongest x such
that for any c0 denoting x such that for all p0 of the same type as p and good finals d:
(72) EXH(not-p or (c0 & p0 d,c EXH(not-p or (p0 d
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For convenience, take the good final d to just be and >)), where > is the tautology
(plus the appropriate number of closing parentheses).
(73) EXH(not-p or (c0 & p0 and >)),c EXH(not-p or (p0 and >))
Now suppose, for contradiction, that we try to restrict the context expressed by c0 by
leaving out some world w. That is, some world w of c is not in Jc0K. Assume further
that p0 is true in w. Then, we would have that p0 and > is true in w but c0 & p0 and
> is not true in w. But then it immediately follows that:
(74) EXH(not-p or (c0 & p0 and >)) 6,c EXH(not-p or (p0 and >))
This is because for at least one world in c, if not-p is true, the right-hand side is
false, as both disjuncts are true, whereas the left-hand side is true; and if not-p is
false, the right-hand side is true and the left-hand side is false, as both disjuncts are
false. Therefore the local context of p in EXH(not-p or (p and q)) uttered in some
context c is indeed simply c. That is, no world w of c can be left out in considering
p.
Before we turn to applying this result to the crucial puzzle, let us mention how
this account does not run into trouble with cases like (75), which were problematic
for theories like Geurts 1996, according to which the local context of the second
disjunct is the global context. The specific problem was that the presupposition
of too would not be satisfied that way. Also recall that we argued against local
accommodation of that presupposition in the second disjunct.
(75) Either John doesn’t smoke, or Mary does, too.
In Schlenker’s (2009) account, (75) is clearly accounted for if no exhaustivity
operator is present. In that case, the local context for the second disjunct includes
the negation of the first one, and the presupposition is satisfied. But what about the
parse with the exhaustivity operator present? If it were the preferred one, we would
run into the same problem as Geurts (1996) because the local context for the second
disjunct would become the global context and the presupposition of too would not be
satisfied. It thus follows that the need to satisfy the presupposition of too necessitates
the absence of the exhaustivity operator in (75). Since the sentence would have an
undefined value otherwise, it is natural to assume that speakers parse (75) without
exhaustivity operator. Note moreover that this does not affect the truth-conditions
of the sentence. There is thus no reason for which (75) should be given the parsing
with exhaustification.26
26 See Section 5.3 for discussion on how our proposal relates to economy constraints on the distribution
of exhaustification.
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4.4.2 Exhaustification and non-redundancy
Having seen the effect of exhaustification on local contexts in Schlenker’s system,
we can show how the central problem in this paper can be addressed. (76), repeated
from above, is not predicted to be deviant by the local non-redundancy condition
anymore, provided it is exhaustified as in (77). This is so because the local context
of the first conjunct in the second disjunct, she is (pregnant), becomes the global
context once an exhaustivity operator is present in the structure. More precisely,
as seen above, the local context of the entire second disjunct becomes the global
context and in turn, given the prediction of Schlenker’s (2009) system for the first
conjunct of a conjunction, the local context of the first conjunct is also the global
context. As a consequence, she is (pregnant) is not redundant anymore.
(76) Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and it doesn’t show.
(77) EXH [Mary isn’t pregnant or she is and it doesn’t show]
This proposal importantly does not over-generate with respect to simple disjunctions.
That is, we do not predict that the degraded (78) should be acceptable when read
exhaustively because it can have a reading in which she is pregnant is not locally
redundant.
(78) #Either Mary isn’t expecting a daughter, or she is pregnant.
While exhaustification indeed would make she is pregnant non-redundant in its
local context, there is another reason for the oddness of (78). It is a tautological
sentence. To see this, consider the corresponding conditional in (79).27 Thereby (78)
is redundant in the global context, and thus it is blocked by the local non-redundancy
condition at that level.
(79) #If Mary is expecting a daughter, she is pregnant.
The degraded status of (80) and (81), repeated from (14a) and (15a), also remains
unaffected by the present proposal.
(80) #If Mary is pregnant, then she is and it doesn’t show.
(81) #Mary is pregnant, and she is and it doesn’t show.
27 We are not claiming here that (78) and (79) are equivalent. We are only using the latter because we
think it helps in illustrating the tautological status of the former.
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Consider first the case of (80). Here we have to side with those in the literature that
assume that conditionals do not have the same scalar alternatives as disjunctions.28
As a consequence, unlike in the case of disjunction, exhaustification does not have an
effect on the local context of the consequent of (80) and therefore (80) is predicted
to be deviant, whether exhaustified or not.
(82) JEXH [If Mary is pregnant, she is and it doesn’t show]K =JIf Mary is pregnant, she is and it doesn’t showK
Parallel reasoning applies to the conjunctive case in (81). Even though and has or
as a scalar alternative, exhaustification does not have an effect on (81). The reason
is that in this case the alternative with or is already entailed by the assertion with
and. Consequently it does not wind up being negated by exhaustification. Again this
vacuity of exhaustification is already apparent once and has been parsed. So there is
no effect on the local context of she is (pregnant):
(83) JEXH [Mary is pregnant, and she is and it doesn’t show]K =JMary is pregnant, and she is and it doesn’t showK
In sum, by adopting Schlenker’s theory of local contexts in addition to the local
redundancy account, we can account for our disjunctive puzzle above. And this
constitutes our second implementation of the proposed solution to the problem.
In the next section, we turn to discussing various issues related to the effect of
exhaustification and assumptions about alternatives. Each of these cases is significant
for both implementations discussed above.
5 Discussion
5.1 Semantic effects of exhaustification
In this section, we discuss the possible readings of our crucial sentence and a
more realistic view of alternatives. In addition, in Section 5.1.3, we go back to a
comparison between the two implementations proposed above and we identify a
potential argument for the local context-based one.
28 In particular, we have to assume that conditional perfection of a conditional if p, q is not obtained
via exhaustification of the conjunctive alternative ¬p^ q of the corresponding disjunction ¬p_ q
(see Franke 2011 for discussion). Notice that this is compatible with conditionals having different
alternatives, for instance alternatives corresponding to the antecedent and the consequent (thanks to
Raj Singh (p.c.) for pointing this out).
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5.1.1 Is exhaustification really vacuous?
Consider a variant of our crucial example in (84). In the preceding sections, we
claimed that exhaustification in (84) is truth-conditionally vacuous. That is, (84)
would be true in a world where Mary is not pregnant but happy in contrast to (85),
where exhaustification does lead to the familiar exclusive interpretation.
(84) Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and she is happy.
(85) Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is happy.
That disjunctions like (84) can indeed be true in situations verifying the inclusive
interpretation of (85) can be shown as follows. The first part of the speaker’s
utterance in (86) asserts that it is possible that Sue did both of the readings. From
the felicity of the disjunction we conclude that it can be true in such a situation.
(86) I don’t know whether Sue did both of the readings assigned, but at least she
did the first or she didn’t do it but did the second.
(87) shows something similar. Catholic priests are not allowed to marry. Therefore
the possibility that John both became a priest and got married is contextually pro-
hibited. It must thus be possible for the disjunction to be true in a situation where
both John became a priest and didn’t get married.29
(87) Context: Speaking about priests in the Catholic church.
Either John became a priest or he didn’t {and/ but} didn’t get married.
Nevertheless intuition tells us that disjunctions like (84) can have a stronger inter-
pretation, which is, in fact, arguably the preferred interpretation. It seems quite clear
that they can license the bi-conditional inference in (88), which is equivalent to the
exclusive interpretation of the simple disjunction (85).
(88) Mary is pregnant if and only if she is happy.
Recall that disjunctions like (84) depend on exhaustification because without it she
is (pregnant) would be redundant. But then the fact in (88) appears to go against our
claim from Section 3.1 that exhaustification of (84) is vacuous. The interpretation in
(88) should not be available.
29 That (86) and (87) are acceptable is unexpected on Meyer’s (2015) account who argues that cases like
(84) can only be true in situations verifying the exclusive but not the inclusive interpretation of (85).
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5.1.2 Looking closer at the alternatives
We will now show that the interpretation in (88) is also available in our proposal.
For this to be seen clearly, however, it is necessary to look at the way alternatives are
generated a bit more carefully than done so far. In the following, (89) will stay in
schematically for (84).
(89) ¬p_ (p^q)
Sauerland (2004) assumes that a disjunctive sentence of the form in (90) has the
alternatives in (91), that is the disjunction itself, the corresponding conjunction, and
its disjuncts.30
(90) p_q
(91) A lt(p_q) =   p_q, p,q, p^q  
Furthermore, following Sauerland (2004) again, assume that scalar alternatives are
obtained by an algorithm like (92), where scale-mates correspond to what we termed
Horn-alternatives above, with one twist however: in order for (91) to be the set of
relevant alternatives, it follows from (92) that the disjuncts p and q must count as
scale-mates for disjunction. See Sauerland (2004) for discussion of this point.31
(92) Sauerland’s Algorithm: the set A lt(p) contains all and only those alter-
natives that can be obtained from p by replacing one or more scalar items
in p with their scale-mates.
Going back to the disjunctive case in (89), we can now see that if one simply
computes all its possible permutations following the algorithm in (92) we obtain the
set of alternatives in (93).
(93) A lt(¬p_ (p^q)) =
⇢ ¬p_ (p^q),>,?,¬p_q,
¬p^q, p^q, p_q,¬p, p,q
 
What is the set of excludable alternatives constructed from (93)? Remember that the
set of excludable alternatives is defined as in (94), repeated from (22) above.
(94) E xcl(p,P) =
 
q 2 P : p* q^¬9r[r 2 P^ (p^¬q)✓ r] 
30 Sauerland (2004) shows that this assumption is necessary to deal with the scalar implicatures of
certain embedded types of disjunctions noticed by Chierchia (2004). Fox (2007) adopts this view to
deal with free-choice inferences of disjunctions embedded under existential modals.
31 Note that in light of this last assumption a potentially more adequate way of establishing the correct
set of alternatives might be Fox & Katzir’s (2011) one (see also Katzir 2007).
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As the reader can verify, the excludable alternatives of (93) are as in (95).
(95) E xcl((¬p_ (p^q)),A lt(¬p_ (p^q))) =   ?,¬p^q  
(95) includes ¬p^q, the negation of which leads to the biconditional interpretation.
But then there is a way to generate the exclusive interpretation for (89) after all.
This has the consequence that our crucial example in (84), has to be read exclusively
when it is exhaustified. That is, it gets the bi-conditional inference in (88).32
5.1.3 Consequences of non-vacuous exhaustification
As we have just seen, exhaustification in (84) is not vacuous anymore, and as we have
also seen this is a good result. But then the question is how we account for the fact
that disjunctions parallel to (84) are assertable in contexts where the bi-conditional
inference in (88) is absent, such as (96) repeated from above. Here crucially, it
cannot be required that Mary did not do the first assignment only if she did the
second one.
(96) I don’t know whether Sue did both of the readings assigned, but at least she
did the first or she didn’t do it but did the second.
A simple answer to the issue presented by (96) is that in such cases the context
(the linguistic context in (96) to be precise) blocks the crucial alternative necessary
for generating the exclusive interpretation from being in the set of alternatives. In
the case of (96) that crucial alternative would be p^q—i.e., the proposition that
Sue did both readings. The speaker’s ignorance assertion effectively amounts to the
assertion that Sue might have done both readings. So it seems reasonable not to
32 It should be noted here that there are good independent reasons not to adopt an alternative construction
algorithm as unconstrained as the one in (92) (Fox 2007, Magri 2009, Chemla 2010, Romoli 2012).
What is crucial for us, though, is that the algorithm must also not be too constrained. In particular,
Fox’s 2007 one in (i) cannot be adopted as it is as it would block the proposition ¬p^q, which is
crucial for deriving the bi-conditional inference, from being in the set of excludable alternatives in
(95) as the reader can check.
(i) Fox’s Algorithm: for any p, A lt(p) is the smallest set, such that:
a. p 2A lt(p)
b. If q 2A lt(p) and r can be derived from q by replacement of a single scalar item with
one of its scale-mates, and q does not entail r, r 2A lt(p).
Rather what is needed for our purposes is a modification of (ib) where q does not entail r is replaced
with q does not asymmetrically entail r (Magri 2009). Again, the reader can check that this does
leave ¬p^q in the set of excludable alternatives as desired. For the sake of presentation, we will go
on using the simpler algorithm stated in the text.
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include the alternative in the relevant ones as this would have the consequence that
exhaustification excludes it, which would defeat the first part of (96). For this to go
trough, it is necessary to assume that context can restrict the set of alternatives from
the set of excludable ones before exhaustification takes place (cf. Rooth 1992, Fox
& Katzir 2011 among others).
What are the consequences of all this for the two accounts of our crucial examples
discussed in the preceding sections? Nothing really changes for the local non-
redundancy account. Since exhaustification makes the global context also the local
one for she is (pregnant), it is made non-redundant and the sentence is assertable.
Things are, however, different for the incremental non-redundancy condition.
Recall that under this account (84) is only assertable if no material is incrementally
redundant, a prerequisite of which is that no material is globally redundant to begin
with. Now, she is (pregnant) is not globally redundant if no simplification of the
exhaustification of (84) – that is, (97a) – can be found that is equivalent to (97a). We
have just seen that (97a) is equivalent to (88), which is in turn equivalent to (97b).
But since (97b) is a simplification of (97a), it would follow that she is (pregnant) is
globally and incrementally redundant. Therefore (84) should be non-assertable after
all under the incremental non-redundancy condition.
(97) a. EXH [Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and she is happy]
b. EXH [Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is happy]
There are two possible responses to consider in defense of the incremental non-
redundancy condition at this point as far as we can see. First, one might change the
alternative algorithm so that no bi-conditional interpretation is derived for (97a).
This way, the solution along the lines of the incremental non-redundancy condition
discussed would be left in tact. This would, however, mean that the observed
bi-conditional interpretation must come about by some other means.
Alternatively or in addition to this first way of dealing with the issue, one might
think that the bi-conditional interpretation is derived by embedded exhaustification
(see Meyer 2015 for a proposal along these lines). In particular, for (98), it would
mean having EXH embedded in the first disjunct.
(98) [EXH Mary isn’t pregnant], or she is and she is happy
The problem that we see for an LF like (98), however, is that it would not straight-
forwardly derive the desired bi-conditional interpretation. What are the alternatives
that EXH in (98) would negate?33 The minimal set of alternatives to the first disjunct
in (98) includes Mary isn’t pregnant and Mary isn’t happy. Only the latter will
33 Notice that, as Meyer (2015) discusses, this line of thinking works well if there is no negation in the
first disjunct. With negation present, however, we do not see how this account could work.
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be excluded by EXH, which means that (98) would be equivalent to (99), which is
equivalent to saying that Mary is happy. This, however, is clearly not an attested
interpretation of (98).
(99) Mary isn’t pregnant and she is happy, or she is pregnant and she is happy.
It therefore seems to us that the local non-redundancy condition is better equipped to
handle the bi-conditional interpretation of (84). We leave a more detailed comparison
between the incremental non-redundancy account and the local context based one
for future research.
5.2 Extension to embeddings
One question at this point is what happens in cases in which the disjunction is
embedded in a more complex sentence. Consider for instance the example in (100),
which is again acceptable with or without the parts in parentheses.
(100) If Mary isn’t pregnant or (she is and) she hides it, she can take the plane.
A simple extension of both strategies above is to allow exhaustification to happen
also at embedded levels. One way to do this is in a grammatical approach to
scalar implicatures, where EXH is conceived as an actual covert operator in the
Logical Form of sentences, which can, therefore, quite naturally appear at embedded
levels (see Magri 2011, Fox 2007, Chierchia et al. 2012 and Sauerland 2012 among
others). In the case of (100), in particular, we assume that EXH is embedded in
the antecedent. As is easy to show both implementations above make the right
predictions. As for the second implementation, in particular, the local context of the
relevant part corresponds to the context of the entire embedded disjunction— that
is, exhaustification has the same effect as discussed for our crucial examples but
at an embedded level. As for the first implementation, it is easy to show that
exhaustification would make it so that at the point of she is, she is is not incrementally
redundant and thus the sentence below is not predicted to be infelicitous.
(101) If EXH [Mary isn’t pregnant or she is and she hides it], she can take the
plane.
In sum, by allowing embedded exhaustification, we are able to extend both of the
strategies above to cases like (100), where our disjunctive case appears embedded in
a more complex sentence. And, conversely, if our proposal is on the right track, it
can also be taken as an argument for the possibility of embedded exhaustification
and approaches allowing it like the grammatical approach to scalar implicatures.
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5.3 Economy considerations on exhaustification and assertability
Let us briefly discuss how our proposal relates to the fact that exhaustification is
generally assumed to be constrained by economy conditions (Fox 2007, Chierchia
et al. 2012 among others).34 For instance, Chierchia et al. (2012) argue that EXH
should not be inserted if it does not lead to a stronger meaning overall, a requirement
we could formulate as in (102).
(102) Do not insert EXH in a sentence S if it leads to an equivalent or weaker
meaning than S itself.
Conditions like (102), however, are also assumed to be overridden if exhaustifi-
cation applies for independent reasons. In particular, exhaustification is generally
assumed to be possible in any case where it allows to rescue the sentence from non-
assertability. A case at hand are so-called Hurford disjunctions like (103), which are
assumed to involve exhaustification as in (104) (see Section 5.4 below). Crucially,
cases like (103) can also appear in downward entailing contexts like (105), which
requires embedded exhaustification as in (106), in violation of (102). In cases like
(106), the assumption is that (102) can be overridden by the necessity of rescuing
the sentence from being non-assertable.
(103) John solved some of the problems or he solved them all.
(104) EXH [John solved some of the problems] or he solved them all
(105) If John solved some or all of the problems, he will pass the exam.
(106) If [EXH [John solved some of the problems]] or he solved them all, he will
pass the exam.
Similarly, we argue that EXH can always be inserted in cases like (107) or embedded
cases like (100), regardless of whether it ends up strengthening the meaning or not.
This is because it is justified by the fact that it rescues the sentence from violating
the non-redundancy condition.
(107) EXH [either Mary isn’t pregnant or she is and it doesn’t show]
5.4 The problem of Hurford disjunctions
We have discussed two problems for the global redundancy condition, but we
have not mentioned one potential motivation for it: so-called Hurford disjunctions
(Hurford 1974, Singh 2008, Chierchia et al. 2012), such as (108a) and (108b) (Meyer
2013, Katzir & Singh 2014). Here the disjuncts stand in an entailment relation to each
34 Thanks to Raj Singh (p.c.) and Daniel Rothschild (p.c.) for suggesting this discussion here.
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other. One natural way to account for the degraded status of (108a) and (108b) is to
appeal to the fact they are equivalent to the structurally less complex (108c). Thus
she is expecting a daugther is redundant, and by the global redundancy condition
(108a) and (108b) are blocked.
(108) a. #Either Mary is pregnant, or she is expecting a daughter.
b. #Either Mary is expecting a daughter, or she is pregnant.
c. Mary is pregnant.
If we turn to our two proposals above, however, we can see that while they can
account for the non-assertability of (108a), they both have problems in accounting
for the non-assertability of (108b).
Consider the incremental implementation first. It is clear that it predicts (108a)
to be deviant. When the second disjunct is evaluated, it is not followed by any other
constituent. Therefore, she is expecting a daughter is both globally and incrementally
redundant. On the other hand, the incremental condition incorrectly predicts (108b)
to be assertable. The reason is that Mary is expecting a daughter as the first disjunct
does have continuations, such as in (109), which render it globally informative.
Therefore, it does not count as incrementally redundant in (108b).
(109) Either Mary is expecting a daughter, or she is not pregnant at all.
Consider now the second implementation based on local contexts. The proposal as
it stands cannot even account for the deviance of (108a). The negation of the first
disjunct in (108a) does not entail that Mary is expecting a daughter— in fact it entails
the opposite as it states that she isn’t pregnant at all. As discussed by Schlenker
(2009), however, if we assume that sentences should not only add information to their
local contexts but also be compatible with them, we can account for the deviancy
of (108a) (see also Büring 2003). She is expecting a daughter is not redundant in
its local context but rather contradicts it, a situation which is also to be ruled out.
This, however, still leaves open why the symmetric version of (108a) in (108b) is
also degraded. (108b) is not accounted for because this time Mary is pregnant does
not contradict its local context (i.e. the global context updated with the negation that
Mary is expecting a daughter).
This situation is therefore puzzling. On the one hand, we established that
incrementality is called for to account for order effects and for our disjunction puzzle.
That is, the incremental version is necessary to account for both the examples with
conjunction in Section 2.2 and the disjunctions discussed in Section 3.3. The global
redundancy condition, on the other hand, now appears to be necessary in the Hurford
disjunction cases above. Here the incremental redundancy condition and the local
context solution seem to make the wrong predictions.
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One line to explore in response to this problem is to assume that disjunctions are
symmetric when it comes to local contexts (see Schlenker 2009 and Rothschild 2011
and footnote 18 for discussion). What this would mean, is considering a symmetric
version of incrementality (maybe to be used as a last resort). For discussion on
this option, see Schlenker 2008, 2009. We leave a more thorough investigation of
Hurford’s disjunctions within the incremental approach and the local redundancy
approach for future research.35 We turn now to a brief discussion of the consequences
of our second solution for the way one thinks about local contexts.
5.5 Dynamic versus static
In the last few years, a debate has emerged in the literature on presuppositions
between the traditional approach to presupposition projection based on dynamic
semantics (Karttunen 1974, Heim 1983, Beaver 2001, Chierchia 2009) and more
recent proposals (Schlenker 2008, 2009, Fox 2008, Chemla 2010, George 2008; see
also Rothschild 2011 for a response from the dynamic perspective). The main point
of contention is the claim that the dynamic approach is not explanatory and parsi-
monious enough when it comes to predicting the projection of presuppositions in a
sentence from the meaning of its parts (Schlenker 2008, 2009; see also Soames 1989,
Heim 1990, 1992). Most of the new proposals abandon the notion of local context
together with dynamicity. As we have seen, Schlenker (2009), instead, reconstructs
this notion in his static system. While these two approaches to local contexts are
provably equivalent in the domain of presupposition projection (Schlenker 2007,
2009), we have shown above that the account of redundancy in disjunction given
in this paper can be taken to be an argument for Schlenker’s system as a dynamic
system based on Context Change Potentials cannot easily adopt the same solution
(Section 4.2). In this section, we also want to show that the problem pointed out
above with dynamic semantics is independent, as far as we can see, from the above
mentioned explanatory problem.
To illustrate this point, it is instructive to briefly see how Schlenker’s (2009)
dynamic implementation of his incremental system deals with the problematic data
with redundancy considered in the present paper. Schlenker shows that while in his
system an incremental algorithm can be combined with a purely static semantics,
there is no technical difficulty in using it to constrain the lexical entries of a dynamic
semantics.36 The latter, constrained in this way, would not run into trouble with the
explanatory problem anymore. Then Schlenker goes on to say that the reason for not
35 Notice that the global account needs various further assumptions to account for these Hurford’s cases;
see Meyer 2013 for discussion.
36 For a different way of constraining dynamic semantics see Rothschild 2011. As far as we can see, all
the points we make below with respect to Schlenker’s system extend also to Rothschild’s one.
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choosing the dynamic implementation would just be Occam’s razor.37 Essentially,
what the dynamic implementation of Schlenker’s system is doing is using the
incremental algorithm for deciding among possible lexical entries for the CCP
of unary and binary connectives. So for instance, disjunction would be defined as in
(110).38
(110) c[f or y] 6= # iff
a. lc(c,f ,(_ or y)) doesn’t entail f and
b. lc(c,y,(f or _)) doesn’t entail y
if 6= #, c[f or y] = {w 2 c : f(w)}[{w0 2 c : y(w0)}
Crucially, the local contexts here are computed via the incremental algorithm in-
dicated above. Therefore in the case of (110) we would have the local context of
f to be c and the local context of y to be c f . But then, for the same reason as
above our crucial disjunctive sentence is predicted to be degraded. This is because
the local context of the second disjunct is computed compositionally at the level of
the disjunction, so when the latter is combined with EXH, we have the same problem
as before— i.e., EXH will assert the prejacent and this will lead to redundancy.
In sum, we think that the fact that also Schlenker’s dynamic system has problems
with the redundancy case discussed here is interesting for three reasons: first, it
shows the independence between the explanatory problem for dynamic semantics
and the problem arising with redundancy. Second, it shows that in order to solve
the problem above, it is not enough to make dynamic semantics “incremental”, so
to speak, in the way Schlenker does. Third, the redundancy case might indeed be
giving us a potential reason beyond parsimony to choose between the static and the
dynamic versions of Schlenker’s system, favouring the static version.
5.6 A potential problem: conjunction under negation
In this paper, we propose that a sentence like (111), repeated from above, is assertable
because it is exhaustified. This was either because exhaustification would make the
she is (pregnant) part not incrementally redundant (first solution), or because in this
case in Schlenker’s (2009) system, the local context of she is (pregnant) would not
include the negation of the first disjunct but would simply be the global context
(second solution).
(111) Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is and it doesn’t show.
37 Thanks to Kjell Johan Sæbø for discussion on this point.
38 Notice that for simplicity we are disregarding the conditions about presuppositions, which should
also enter into the definition of the CCP.
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For the same reason, however, we predict that we should be able to rescue (112),
with the intended reading schematised in (113), by exhaustifying it.
(112) #It’s not the case that Mary is expecting a daughter and she is pregnant.
(113) ¬(p^q)
For concreteness, let us illustrate the problem using the second solution based on
local contexts, it is easy to see that the problem extends to the first approach based
on incremental redundancy. Consider the prediction of Schlenker (2009) for (113).
(113) is equivalent to ¬p_¬q. Therefore, if ¬p is true, then the whole negated
conjunction is predicted to be true. Consequently, in evaluating q we can restrict the
context to p-worlds. This, in turn, means that the local context of q in (113) is the
global context intersected with p.
In parallel to the disjunction case, however, if we exhaustify (113) as in (114)
we cannot ignore ¬p-worlds anymore, when evaluating the second conjunct q. This
is because if ¬p is true the truth-value of the whole sentence will not automatically
be true anymore, but rather it will depend on the truth-value of q: if q is false, the
whole sentence will be false, but if q is true, the whole sentence will be true. As
seen above, in Schlenker’s (2009) system, this means that we have to consider now
both p- and ¬p-worlds in evaluating q. In other words, in a negated conjunction, the
local context of the second conjunct q is the global context.
(114) EXH[¬(p^q)]⌘ ¬(p^q)^ (p_q)
In sum, we appear to have an incorrect prediction here: if (111) is rescued by
exhaustification, we should be able to rescue (112) in the same way. The latter,
however, is hopelessly unassertable.
There is, however, a crucial difference between (111) and (112): the exhaus-
tification of the latter, but not the former, gives rise to a result that is in conflict
with plausible pragmatic conditions on the assertability of the latter. To illustrate,
consider what the alternatives of (113) are, when p entails q, as in the case in (112).
(115) A lt(¬(p^q)) =
8>><>>:
¬(p^q) = ¬p
¬p
¬q
¬(p_q) = ¬q
9>>=>>; =
⇢ ¬p
¬q
 
The problem is that only ¬q is excludable. As a consequence the exhaustification of
¬(p^q) becomes ¬p^q assuming that p entails q. This, however, means that by
hearing (112) we should conclude that Mary is pregnant (and that she isn’t expecting
a daughter). In other words, from a negated conjunction, we should conclude the
falsity of one of its conjuncts and the truth of the other. There are good reasons
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to believe that this should be blocked independently. In particular, it is natural
to think that a negated conjunction ¬(p^ q)—like its corresponding disjunction
¬p_¬q—should not be assertable unless both ¬p and ¬q have a chance of being
true (Gazdar 1979, Fox 2007 among many others for discussion). A condition like
this, however, is enough to rule the assertion of (112) out. That is, it rules (112)
out, when the latter is exhaustified. When (112) is not exhaustified, it is blocked
by the local redundancy condition because the second conjunct is redundant in its
local context. In other words, (112) is correctly predicted to have no way of being
assertable.
6 Conclusion
The present paper discussed novel data which are problematic for assertability
conditions based on redundancy (Stalnaker 1979, Fox 2008, Schlenker 2009, Singh
2007, Chierchia 2009, Meyer 2013, Katzir & Singh 2014 among others). The specific
problem was constituted by disjunctions like Either Mary isn’t pregnant, or she is
and it doesn’t show. The optional presence of she is (pregnant) is not predicted
by non-redundancy conditions in the literature. In response to the puzzle, we have
proposed a solution based on exhaustification and a notion of redundancy relying
on incrementality. We have then explored two ways of implementing this solution.
The first implementation is based on the notion of incremental redundancy by Fox
(2008, 2013), which does not make use of local contexts. We showed that this
approach, together with exhaustification and a constraint on the interaction between
exhaustification and redundancy (Meyer 2013), can account for the disjunctive
puzzle above. The second implementation is based on a theory of redundancy based
on local contexts whereby a sentence is not assertable if any of its parts is redundant
in its local context (Schlenker 2009 among many others). Moreover, crucially, we
also showed that Schlenker’s (2009) incremental theory of local contexts needs to be
adopted. This way, exhaustifying the problematic sentence leads to a modification
of the local context of she is (pregnant), so that the latter is not locally redundant
anymore.
We argued that both implementations of the solution improve over competing ap-
proaches to the current puzzle. But we also pointed out that the incremental approach
might have problems in deriving the correct interpretations via exhaustification once
a more realistic view of the set of available alternatives is adopted, problems which
the account based on local contexts avoids. Since we also argued that the latter
account crucially relies on Schlenker’s approach to local contexts rather than the one
of dynamic semantics—where local contexts are computed compositionally on the
basis of syntactic structure—all of this together might entail that the solution to our
crucial example provides evidence for Schlenker’s view of local contexts.
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